
The Consequences of Taliban Policies on Human Rights in Afghanistan (August 2021–August 2023)

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ABSTRACT Following the collapse of the Islamic Republic regime, the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in August 2021. The Taliban's abolition of the 2004 constitution and other internal regulations has set the stage for Taliban fighters to engage in violent and arbitrary practices. The dismal human rights situation in Afghanistan has prompted international organizations to express serious concerns and to demand an examination of the Taliban regime's conduct toward the Afghan people. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the repercussions of the Taliban's policies on citizen rights, which are divided into two distinct categories: civil-political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights. This research uses qualitative methods through an applied documentary approach, assessing 102 international research articles, reports, and analyses on civil rights in Afghanistan over a two-year period, informed by the author's experience in policy formulation in Afghanistan. Engagements with primary sources in Afghanistan also corroborated research findings. The research demonstrates the extent to which the repeal of Afghanistan's constitution and laws has triggered unlawful policies and egregious behaviors that have had detrimental consequences on human rights.

Keywords: Afghanistan; human rights; Taliban; applied policy

Government policies shape the legal foundations of a nation-state. Prior to the Taliban's ascendancy in August 2021, the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan prioritized human rights policies. A commitment to protecting human rights was evident across executive, legislative, and judicial spheres. This includes the preamble of the 2004 Constitutional Law, which reflects the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as cited in Article 7.¹ Afghanistan also recognized seven international human rights conventions to reaffirm its commitment to human rights.² Parliament, the Independent Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan, the Constitutional Monitoring Commission, the Independent Election Commission, and the Ministry of Women's Affairs were all tasked with enforcing and monitoring human rights standards. Furthermore, the courts aimed to safeguard citizens' fair judgment and access to justice by enforcing civil laws, criminal codes, laws prohibiting violence against women, and other domestic legislation in accordance with human rights principles. Despite challenges in meeting some of these commitments, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan had made meaningful strides in including human rights principles in its civil legislation.

This changed after the takeover by the Taliban, which immediately eradicated fundamental legal safeguards to human rights. In February 2023, the Human Rights Council wrote: "The de facto authorities suspended the 2004 Constitution and all domestic legislation, notably the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women, and abolished institutions and mechanisms that promoted gender equality and provided protection against gender-based violence, such as the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the Ministry of Women's Affairs."³ Afghanistan's Independent Constitutional Monitoring Commission and Independent Election Commission were both disbanded.

This suspension of legal mandates and its impact on institutions that previously set the basis of state policies governing its citizens has created substantial problems under Taliban rule. The ensuing legal vacuum served as justification for violent

conduct and maltreatment of Afghan citizens. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) issued a report on July 20, 2022, documenting comprehensive accounts of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, and maltreatment of ex-officials, security personnel, civil activists, media personnel, and human rights advocates. According to the study, between Aug. 15, 2021 and June 15, 2022 there were 243 extrajudicial killings, 1,001 instances of arbitrary and illegal detention, 570 cases of torture and mistreatment, 700 incidents of civilian fatalities, and 1,401 instances of injury.⁴

Despite the provisional declaration of the 1964 constitution serving as the legal foundation of Taliban rule, the regime claims absolute governing authority, akin to a monarchy. The Taliban do not enforce constitutional protections of civil liberties and the rights of individuals. They do not support the parliament nor the electoral system. The Taliban's policymaking relies solely on the Taliban code of conduct (*Layeha*)⁵ passed in 2010,⁶ and on the orders issued by their leaders.

It is thus timely to consider the profound effects of these fundamental institutional changes and their implications for the people of Afghanistan. This article specifically examines the impacts and ramifications of the Taliban's policies on human rights. As the spotlight has turned away from Afghanistan, with diminishing coverage and access to information, the main question driving this analysis is: how do the Taliban's policies affect the rights of citizens in Afghanistan? The Taliban's eradication of legal institutions, such as the Afghanistan Constitution, has resulted in the emergence of a legal vacuum. The transition from rule by the previous Afghan government to full control by the Taliban has resulted in a proliferation of human rights violations and other forms of suffering for the people of Afghanistan, especially women, ethnic groups, and minorities. This article aims to highlight just how far human rights conditions have deteriorated.

This research employs a framework that draws from Stephen Marks' classification of human rights, with some modifications specific to the context of

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Afghanistan. Marks categorizes five types of civil-political rights, which are outlined in the international human rights documents approved in 1948 (Declaration of Human Rights) and 1966 (Human Rights Covenants).⁷ These include rights governing physical integrity, intellectual independence, implementation of justice, civil society participation, and political participation. In the first section of my analysis, I focus on Taliban policies regarding civil and political rights by focusing on two overarching headings: (1) rights based on physical integrity; and (2) rights based on participation in civil society. In the second section, I shift the discussion to focus on economic, social, and cultural rights, again drawing from Marks’ framework. For the purpose of this analysis, I focus specifically on economic, social, and political rights in two sections entitled “rights based on work and social support” and “rights to education and culture.”

The Impact of Taliban Policies on Civil and Political Rights

1. Rights based on physical integrity

These rights, considered among the most fundamental of human rights, include freedom from slavery, freedom from arbitrary detention, and humane behavior toward people under arrest.⁸ With the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in 2021 there was an immediate and significant reduction in victims of direct conflict. Nonetheless, many people’s lives were endangered, including those of former government officials, civil activists, journalists, human rights advocates, and artists. Human Rights Watch reported that “When the Taliban entered Kabul, thousands of Afghans attempted to flee their country in fear of the Taliban, but couldn’t due to airport chaos.”⁹ The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has subsequently stated that Afghanistan has become one of the most dangerous countries for its citizens. From January to December 2021,¹⁰ UNAMA and OHCHR documented at least 8,300 civilian casualties, including at least 2,400 killed and 5,900 injured. Women and children accounted for almost half

of all civilian casualties in the first 11 months of 2021. After seizing control, the Taliban conducted door-to-door searches to apprehend ex-government officials, soldiers, democracy supporters, and opponents. For the first six months into their rule, the Taliban’s actions of searching homes and making arrests terrorized society at large. Both UNAMA and OHCHR say that targeted assassinations in Afghanistan have instilled fear and forced numerous human rights defenders to flee. In response, these organizations gave shelter to 97 displaced people and submitted 390 letters attempting to secure visas in 2021.¹¹

The absence of an autonomous judiciary system under the Taliban administration, along with the presence of Taliban extremists in key judicial positions, has resulted in the unlawful and arbitrary treatment of former government personnel, Taliban opponents, and ethnic and religious minority groups. On Aug. 17, 2021, the ruling authorities issued a general amnesty for former Afghan government officials and members of the national security and defense forces. However, the amnesty has not been consistently implemented. Between Aug. 15, 2021, and June 15, 2022, UNAMA documented at least 160 extrajudicial executions of former government and security officers by members of the ruling elite.¹² According to investigations by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), corpses were displayed publicly to prove a point, heightening fear among citizens.¹³ Since September 2022, Taliban authorities dismissed a considerable number of judges and sidelined prosecutors. The Human Rights Council noted that “Female judges and those belonging to religious minority groups, mainly Shia Muslims, have been removed.”¹⁴ International and human rights organizations, especially Amnesty International, expressed concern about the failure to act against human rights violations in Afghanistan.¹⁵

Taliban executions and public punishments instill widespread fear among Afghans. The first official public execution occurred in Farah in December 2022 witnessed by the deputy prime minister, various other ministers, and the head of the judiciary. The Amnesty International Report

2022–2023 revealed that from November 2022 to January 2023, Taliban authorities subjected 180 individuals, comprising women, men, and children, to public floggings across various provinces.¹⁶ There have been questionable apprehensions, instances of individuals disappearing, and mysterious deaths. The Taliban then displayed corpses in public to deter others.¹⁷ The Human Rights Watch report, dated July 7, 2022, documented a mass grave uncovered by residents in eastern Afghanistan, which contained the remains of over 100 men. The rationale for mass execution by Taliban security forces was the victims' alleged support for ISIS.¹⁸

The right to life of Afghan citizens is violated in the form of targeted attacks on ethnic-religious minorities, while perpetrators are unprosecuted and unpunished. Attacks on the Sikh temple in Kabul on June 18, 2022 and the Hazara educational center on Sept. 30, 2022, for example, killed at least 52 female students. In September 2022, the Taliban began disseminating footage and photographs of the National Resistance Front's associates murdered in Panjshir.¹⁹ The Taliban also consistently carry out forced evictions of a large number of people from their homes in provinces such as Daikundi, Uruzgan, and Kandahar. These actions are motivated by accusations of supporting the previous government administration. The most widespread expulsion occurred in September 2021, when Hazara families were forced to abandon their homes in Gizab and Daikundi districts.²⁰ According to Hazara activists, the Taliban seized homes and displaced 1,200 Hazaras in Daikundi.²¹ The Taliban have not apprehended or prosecuted those responsible for targeted attacks, unlawful killings, or illegal land seizures. The UN Special Rapporteur has expressed concern about retaliation against individuals who file complaints against current authorities.²²

2. Rights based on civil society and political participation

Article 25 of the Human Rights Covenant states that every citizen has an equal right to participate in public affairs and to receive public services. Article 33 of Afghanistan's 2004 Constitution clearly states that citizens have the right to vote and to be elected.

Articles 34 and 35 of this law underscore the importance of the freedom of expression and the freedom to establish civic institutions and political parties. Furthermore, under Article 36 of this law, citizens have the right to peaceful assembly and demonstration. However, in June 2023, the Human Rights Council stated that "The Taliban's advent brought about the systematic exclusion of women from Afghanistan's social and political spheres. Prior to August 2021, female representation in parliament stood at 27%, while women accounted for 30% of personnel across government positions, independent commissions, and the judicial system."²³

The Taliban administration prevents women from holding any government or leadership position.²⁴ The Taliban disbanded the Ministry of Women's Affairs on Sept. 18, 2021, replacing it with the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. From September 2021 to May 2023, they issued over 50 rulings curtailing women's rights, including limitations on freedom of assembly, access to education, employment opportunities, judicial procedures, and conduct.²⁵ In November 2022, they prohibited women and girls from visiting parks and sports clubs. Public baths were banned. On Dec. 21, 2022, the Taliban ordered immediate suspension of women's education until further notice. Three days later, women were prohibited from working in non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Roza Otunbayeva, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, stated, "In the history of the United Nations, no regime has tried to ban women [or] prevent them from working in organizations because they are women... [This decision] is against the basic principles of the United Nations and international laws."²⁶

The Taliban's methods to power have barred not only women, but also various ethnic groups, religious minorities, factions, and political parties from public life. Political party activities have been forbidden, and the corresponding department in the Ministry of Justice has been eliminated. Current cabinet officials are now primarily of Pashtun ethnicity. The appointment of provincial leaders by the Taliban's Amir al-Momineen follows a discern-

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able pattern, reflecting a shift of decision-making power from Kabul to Kandahar. The Council of Ulama in Kandahar holds the authority to deny resolutions passed by the cabinet in Kabul, thereby increasing human rights concerns.²⁷ The Taliban leader, Hebatullah Akhundzadeh, continues to consolidate more power, relying on a small group of advisers outside of the de facto government cabinet.²⁸

Additionally, minorities from other religions are excluded from public and political life due to discriminatory laws. The Afghan people and the international community have expressed serious concerns about the Taliban's restrictive policies, particularly those imposing limitations on civic space, media access, and freedom of expression and assembly. Before the Taliban, Afghanistan had a robust media landscape, comprising 1,879 active media outlets, 203 television channels, 349 radio stations, and 1,327 print media publications. Since the Taliban's takeover, there have been considerable restrictions imposed on media and journalism. On Sept. 19, 2021, a directive comprising 11 articles mandated limitations on print, audio, and video media. The articles included advice on refraining from publishing content that contradicts religion, privacy, and national security, as well as avoiding any disrespect towards influential national figures.²⁹

Between August 2021 and February 2023, 245 incidents of press freedom violations were documented, including 130 arrests, acts of physical violence, reprehensible conduct, and torture. Intelligence operatives frequently visit and threaten media workers at their homes and offices. They are warned that if they publish anything critical about the Taliban leadership, they risk arrest or revocation of their licenses. At present, 40 percent of media outlets have ceased operations, and 60 percent of journalists have been relieved of their duties. Of these, 80 percent of women lost their jobs in the radio sector. The Taliban's reinstatement of the Commission of Complaints and Violations of Press Rights in August 2022 has generated questions about its independence, composition, and scope, as reported by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan.³⁰

The Taliban is suppressing civil liberties by restricting media access and banning demonstra-

tions. In the aftermath of August 2021, numerous civil society and media activists reported a decline or termination of activities due to concerns over retaliation. UNAMA documented numerous cases of arbitrary arrests, mistreatment, and torture of civil society activists, human rights defenders, and journalists.³¹

The Impact of Taliban Policies on the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of Citizens

In accordance with international human rights documents, economic, social, and cultural rights comprise of three groups of rights: labor-based rights,³² social support rights,³³ and rights based on education and culture.³⁴ The following section discusses Taliban impact on these kinds of rights.

1. Rights based on work and social support

Poverty and hunger have increased substantially following the Taliban's takeover. A humanitarian crisis is accelerating, rendering millions of Afghans vulnerable. The combination of insufficient income and rising food prices is leading to acute conditions of food insecurity.³⁵ According to UNAMA, about half of Afghanistan is experiencing severe hunger, and 59 percent of the country requires humanitarian aid.³⁶ This represents an increase of six million people since the beginning of 2021. In 2022, more than 90 percent of the population suffered from some form of food insecurity.³⁷ In light of this information, Martin Griffiths, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General of Humanitarian Affairs, announced the following: "My message is urgent: don't shut the door on the people of Afghanistan. Humanitarian partners are on the ground, and they are delivering, despite the challenges. Help us scale up and stave off widespread hunger, disease, malnutrition, and ultimately death by supporting the humanitarian plans."³⁸ The United Nations, in collaboration with various NGOs, announced a joint response plan in Geneva on Jan. 11, 2022.

According to OCHA's 10th report on the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, the number of people displaced from their homes due to war

and hunger has risen to 7.4 million. As of July 2022, more than 6,000 people were displaced from Baghlan, Panjshir, and Parwan.³⁹ Violence and fear continue to force Afghans to leave their homes and seek refuge beyond its borders. Over 2.2 million are registered as refugees and 4 million Afghans are living in nearby countries with varying legal status.⁴⁰ People are leaving or being driven out of Afghanistan primarily because of high prices and the inability to purchase basic necessities.⁴¹ As indicated by reports and tracking tools in October 2021, almost 97 percent of displaced individuals cited job or income loss as the main reasons for leaving.⁴²

Almost all female civil servants who have been relieved of their jobs are prohibited from returning to their government offices. Women's institutions have been disbanded. In August 2021, OCHA conducted a survey investigating the decline of humanitarian activities by human rights organizations in Afghanistan. The survey identified 147 organizations from 34 provinces, including 84 international and 63 national groups. Among these, 54 percent reported a decrease in their operations, attributed to the absence of transparency and lack of consent by the Taliban to reinstate female personnel. Insecurity caused 16 percent of employees to lose their jobs, and 27 percent abstained from work.⁴³ Furthermore, the National Union of Journalists of Afghanistan said that 75 percent of female journalists and 48 percent of male journalists lost their jobs following the Taliban's seizure of control. These figures paint a serious decline in conditions as the UN estimates that around 28 million Afghans, or roughly two-thirds of the population, require humanitarian aid to survive.⁴⁴

2. Rights to education and culture

Article 13 of the Convention of Economic, Social, and Cultural Recognition guarantees every individual access to education. Article 15 of this convention states that everyone has the right to participate in cultural life. However, the Taliban has once again refused girls and women the opportunity to get an education, as they did during their previous regime from 1996 to 2001. Afghanistan is

currently the only country where girls and young women's access to secondary and higher education institutions is restricted.⁴⁵

At the United Nations Security Council meeting held on Sept. 27, 2022, the majority of attendees, including representatives from the United States and France, expressed their support for the rights of girls and women in Afghanistan. The United Arab Emirates condemned the Taliban's policies and demanded the removal of restrictions imposed on women. On Aug. 29, 2021, the Taliban's Higher Education Minister declared that girls are not allowed to study alongside boys. Furthermore, women who submitted scholarship applications for overseas programs beginning in November 2022 were unable to travel due to the Muharram policy.⁴⁶ According to statistics, there were 3.5 million female students registered in 2021, out of a total of 9 million.⁴⁷ If statistics on women denied from attending universities are included this statistic, it would show that a large portion of Afghan citizens are systematically deprived of the right to education. In a January 2022 report, UNOCHA expressed concern that Afghanistan's education system risked collapse because teachers remained unpaid. The Taliban government said it could only pay 30 percent of teacher wages. As a consequence, 10 million students cannot attend school.⁴⁸

The Taliban's coercive constraints on citizens' cultural lives have sparked considerable criticism from both domestic and international communities, notably in terms of cultural rights. It is apparent that their intention is to promote a version of Pashtun culture across the nation. As an illustration, the Taliban have replaced plaques written in the Persian language with Pashto in cities such as Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, where Persian is predominantly spoken.⁴⁹

Prior to Taliban rule, a public holiday was established for the reverence of the people for the first day of the solar year. However, the Taliban has since eliminated it,⁵⁰ along with Valentine's Day celebrations, among others. They argue that celebrating these days endorses Western culture and propagates prostitution. Weddings are now forbid-

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den from having music due to a declaration that considers concerts and musical performances as haram. According to a report by the UN Human Rights Council, cultural heritage has been intentionally destroyed since Aug. 15, 2021, harming cultural diversity and splintering national cohesion. The National Music Institute of Afghanistan’s artworks, such as murals and musical instruments, were destroyed, despite the fact that some places and monuments were protected. Part of the wall of the Balahesar fortress has been damaged, and unlawful excavations have taken place in Gholghele city, the Lashkari bazaar, and ancient monuments of Zargar Tapa.⁵¹

Conclusion

This research on the ramifications of Taliban policy demonstrates how the absence of legal accountability in countries such as Afghanistan can allow governing bodies to act arbitrarily and violate core international human rights norms. Although the Taliban’s rise to power ended a long period of direct conflict, the extent of human rights violations documented in this study demonstrates the rise and spread of violence in Afghanistan. Prior to the Taliban’s rule, despite occasional lapses in government performance, the country’s legal frameworks and human rights policies had made it easier for citizens to enjoy fundamental rights.

Since the Taliban’s takeover, Afghanistan’s legal foundations have been completely dismantled, as have important institutions such as parliament, the Constitution, the Independent Human Rights Commission, the Independent Constitutional Monitoring Commission, the Independent Election Commission, and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Political parties have been disbanded, and the Taliban leadership’s religious edicts fail to represent Afghanistan’s historically pluralistic society.

The Taliban reject human rights and are hostile to notions of democracy based on elections. They view such institutions as a Western idea. They are distrustful of the international community and its laws. They ignore international objections and

carry on unjust and discriminatory policies with impunity, despite severe criticism over the past two years. Notwithstanding international pressure, they continue to impose repressive policies towards women, minorities, and human rights advocates, as well as carrying out violence and intimidation against the media and civil society. Despite the Taliban’s troubling human rights violations, several countries maintain ties with them. Such legitimacy afforded to human rights violators potentially normalizes disregard toward international treaties by governments, and in turn fosters erosion of the rules-based international order.

The Taliban’s strict media restrictions create barriers to reporting on and understanding the alarming changing conditions in Afghanistan, weakening transparency and accountability. As a result, development indicators are declining rapidly, assessed from figures on unemployment, economic recession, forced migration, and overall psychological trauma to the populace. Viewed from a perspective of human rights, the consequences of Taliban policies have been devastating.

The international community should do more to pressure the Taliban to cease systematic violations of human rights. Foreign governments should work to discredit the Taliban’s notion that civil liberties are a Western idea incompatible with Islam. All but a handful of the world’s countries, including Afghanistan, have signed or ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Other majority-Muslim governments should take the lead in insisting that the Taliban meet what are widely considered minimum international standards of governance. The non-majority-Muslim countries should condition any economic and political benefits offered to Afghanistan upon demonstrably improved governance by the Taliban. The situation has deteriorated to the point where the people of Afghanistan require significant international aid to overcome food insecurity. The world should not give up on the Afghan people, but rather should deliver lifesaving support while pinpointing opportunities to guide institutional changes for improving conditions of human rights.

Endnotes

¹ Article 7: The state shall observe the United Nations Charter, interstate agreements, as well as international treaties to which Afghanistan has joined, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The state shall prevent all kinds of terrorist activities, cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and production and use of intoxicants.

² International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); and, International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

³ Human Rights Council (2023, February 9), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, A/HRC/52/84, P4. at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5284-situation-human-rights-afghanistan-report-special-rapporteur>.

⁴ UNAMA (2022, July 20), UN Releases Report on Human Rights in Afghanistan (14 August 2021-15 June 2022). Available https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/20_july_2022_-_un_releases_report_on_human_rights_in_afghanistan_15_august_2021_15_june_2022_english.pdf.

⁵ The Taliban leadership periodically issues Layeha, which serve as ‘codes of conduct’ for their fighters and supporters. Their code of conduct manifesto was issued in Spring 2006. Thereafter, the code was reissued in May 2009 and once again in late May 2010. The May 2010 Layeha was updated with significant changes, including the inclusion of a new chapter and 18 additional rules. It provides crucial insights into the objectives, strategies, and mindset of Afghan Taliban leadership. Layeha include chain of command principles preventing the fragmentation of the various Taliban networks, obtaining and maintaining public support by winning ‘hearts and minds’ of local residents, ensuring enough fighters remain engaged in combat. Currently, Hibatullah Akhundzada, the leader of the Taliban, governs by issuing edicts. His decrees and orders apply to matters concerning the courts, security services, education, and other areas.

⁶ Johnson, Thomas H., and Matthew C. DuPee. 2012. “Analyzing the New Taliban Code of Conduct (Layeha): An Assessment of Changing Perspectives and Strategies of the Afghan Taliban.” *Central Asian* 31. PP 77-91.

⁷ “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” United Nations. (n.d.). Retrieved July 28, 2023, from www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan events 2021 (2021, November 3) “Afghan women wait in a line to receive cash at a money distribution organized by the World Food Program in Kabul”, P1. at <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/afghanistan>.

¹⁰ General Assembly (2022, January 12), Situation of human rights in Afghanistan, and technical assistance achievements in the field of human rights; Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/49/90, P 1. at <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G22/004/41/PDF/G2200441.pdf?OpenElement> – .

¹¹ Ibid. P11.

¹² UNAMA (2022, July 20), UN Releases Report on Human Rights in Afghanistan (14 August 2021-15 June 2022). At https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/20_july_2022_-_un_releases_report_on_human_rights_in_afghanistan_15_august_2021_15_june_2022_english.pdf.

¹³ OCHA, (2021, December 14), Oral update on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, at <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/oral-update-situation-human-rights-afghanistan-14-december-2021>.

¹⁴ Human Rights Council (2023, February 9), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, A/HRC/52/84, P 10. at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5284-situation-human-rights-afghanistan-report-special-rapporteur>.

¹⁵ Amnesty International (2023), The State of the World’s Human Rights, Amnesty International’s Annual Report 2022/2023, P 64. at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/international-system-unfit-to-deal-with-global-crises-annual-report-2022/#:~:text=Amnesty%20International%20Report%202022%2F23,Egypt%20and%20the%20refusal%20to>.

¹⁶ Human Rights Council (2023, February 9), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, A/HRC/52/84, P 12. at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5284-situation-human-rights-afghanistan-report-special-rapporteur>.

¹⁷ Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan Events of 2022. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/afghanistan>.

¹⁸ U.S. State Department (2023, March 20), 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan, at <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/afghanistan/>.

- ¹⁹ Amnesty International (2023), *The State of the World's Human Rights*, Amnesty International's Annual Report 2022/2023, PP 64-65. at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/international-system-unfit-to-deal-with-global-crises-annual-report-2022/#:~:text=Amnesty%20International%20Report%202022%2F23,Egypt%20and%20the%20refusal%20to>.
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- ²¹ Niala, Mohammad, and Zack Udin, (October 2021), *Religious Minorities in Afghanistan*, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. P 2. at <https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2021-10/2021%20Factsheet%20-%20Religious%20Minorities%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf>.
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- ²⁴ Human Rights Council (2023, February 9), *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan*, A/HRC/52/84, P 4. at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5284-situation-human-rights-afghanistan-report-special-rapporteur>.
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